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Sunday, October 27, 2019

International Politics. War. Definition. Theories. Function of War. Treaties onWar. Causes of War. Types of War


War

War is a common experience of mankind.
Each culture experience it in different ways,
It is shaped by varying ethical values, philosophical perspectives, and historical experience.
Throughout history, war has served as a tool for advancing one state’s power over another’s,
It is used as a way of changing, preserving, and regulating the conduct of world affairs

What it is? What it is not?

War is an act of organized violence
It is carried out by political units against each other.
Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit.
Violence carried out in the name of a political unit is not war unless it is directed against another political unit.
War is regarded as the state of sustained hostilities between armed forces of two or more organized groups, like nation-states, who seek to fulfill their goals in a manner that entails the sacrifice of a number of human causalities.
Many examples of violent conflict, such as “gang wars”, race riots, or individual crimes, are not generally considered as wars.
This is because they lack political objectives and do not have political impacts.
To be identified as such, war must involve a clash of the armed forces of two or more organized groups who attempt to pursue a combination of political goals at the possible risk of human and material losses.

Defining War

Since Herodotus and Thucydides, many have speculated about the nature, causes, and consequences of human conflict.
War is, undoubtedly, a nebulous concept.
For war, argues Gilbert Winham, “has had the capacity to shape political relations among nations”.
An illustration of this argument is given by Raymond Aron.
He refers to international relations as “a science of peace and war”,
Hence the title of his work (R. Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of international Relations, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966, p.6).
Aron contends that relations among nations are often marked by conflict,
Conflict occurs because states seek incompatible goals, and that war is a no less natural phenomenon of international relations than peace.
He declares that “inter-state relations present one original feature which distinguishes them from all other social relations: they take place within the shadow of war, or, to use a more rigorous expression, relations among states, involve, in essence, the alternative of war and peace.

Karl von Clauzewitz’s work On War is considered to be one of the most useful studies of this particular element of international relations.
 (K. von Clausewitz, On War, Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1953. See also G. Winham, “The Relevance of Clausewitz To a Theory of International Negotiation”, p. 5.., p. 5)
Clausewitz put it, war is a continuation of policy by other means-so, states, which possess the legitimate authority to use force, may resort to war for whatever political purpose they deem appropriate.
Fundamental in Clausewitzian thought is the link between war and national policy.
 “War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means.
In short, war and politics are inseparably connected; war belongs to policy; and the former is a continuation of the latter through the application of other means.
To emphasize the major importance of this observation, Clausewitz rejects subordination of the political point of view to the military, arguing that policy creates and guides war.
Thus Clausewitz, not surprisingly, suggests that “the minister of war should not be a soldier, but a statesman who knows just enough about war not to expect results from military means and measures which they cannot produce”

Edward Luttwak. In his Strategy: The Logic of Peace and War, he presents an exposition of some of Clausewitz’s propositions.
Luttwak does not see a straightforward “engineering” solution of war because of the complexity arising from the interactions among its political, psychological, and military dimensions.
Thus, in place of the linear thinking of warfare, Luttwak introduces the “paradoxical logic” of strategy as a broader concept that conditions all forms of war and its reciprocal activity.

War Theory

The term “war theory” will be taken to mean the establishment of rules of war as a social tool for specific cultures, based upon the particular notions of that culture’s notions of justice and statehood.

The Western war theory, of the Just War Theory as it is commonly known, is an amalgam assortment of Greek, Roman, Catholic, Enlightenment, and modern notions of war, which have built on each other and been molded into a cohesive theory over the span of some 2300 years.
It argues that wars should be fought for noble and worthwhile reasons.
Just-war theorists also try to establish ethical rules for warfare.
War must be the last option.
All peaceful means to resolve the conflict must be exhausted before war breaks out.
The cause of the war must be just (such as overturning aggression and righting a great wrong).
The war must be winnable.
The war’s purpose must justify the cost in money and lives.
The military must make every effort to prevent or limit civilian casualties.
Western model has no particular authors or time period where the various concepts were welded into a unified theory.
The Just War Theory traces its roots to Aristotle and Cicero.
Its true codification came during the Roman Empire, where war-waging powers were carefully tied to the power of the state, and reflected the Roman values and notions of justice.

Chinese War Theory was developed in the tumultuous period following the decline of influence of the House of Zhou (772 BCE) that ruled over a unified China.
The following five hundred years were a field of war, as local rulers vied for supremacy as the sole power over the once-unified area.
As a result of the destruction and instability caused by the incessant war, there emerged a series of competing politico-philosophical systems that sought to restore peace and harmony.
Alongside these theories emerged a specific class of texts and authors whose primary focus was war theory.
While these arose from the realities of warfare, they also embodied many politico-philosophical ideas, making the war theory compatible with the ideals of statecraft.
The primary texts consist of Xunzi’s Confucian writings and Han Feizi’s Legalist theory, as representative of the two major politico-philosophical movements; and Sunzi’s and Sun Bin’s books on the Art of Waras representative of the war theory.
It is also an extension of the competing politico-philosophical theories, embodying ideas of justice, exemplary rule, and quietism amongst others. Of the various military treatises, the two best known authors, Sunzi and Sun Bin, whose works – separated by nearly two centuries – are both entitled The Art of Warfare.

The Islamic War Theory is a direct outgrowth of the Islamic theories of justice and state, both of which are based on the primary religious sources. While these theories have developed significantly over the 14 centuries of the existence of Islam, and a great many competing conceptions of them exist, all these rely on the same primary sources for the authority of their claims.
Now coming to the Qur’anic theory of war, it is important to say that war is sanctioned only in exceptional circumstances and peace is the norm. The permission for war in Qur’an is given reluctantly and extreme conditions of persecution and oppression. War is not permissible if people of other persuasions, religious faith and nationality are part of any treaty or causing any kind of harm to Muslims. Also, to begin with Muslims should only preach their faith peacefully and even put up with resistance and opposition and bear adverse conditions with patience and endurance of high degree.
Why is humanity prone to war? The Qur'anic answer unfolds in the course of several verses revealed at various times, the essential points of which may be summarized as follows:
First, man's fundamental nature (fitra) is one of moral innocence, that is, freedom from sin. In other words, there is no Islamic equivalent to the notion of "original sin." Moreover, each individual is born with a knowledge of God's commandments, that is, with the essential aspects of righteous behavior. But this moral awareness is eroded as each individual encounters the corrupting influences of human society (30:30).
Second, man's nature is to live on the earth in a state of harmony, and peace with other living things. This is the ultimate import of the responsibility assigned by God to man as His vicegerent (khalifa) on this planet (2:30). True peace (salam) is therefore not merely an absence of war; it is the elimination of the grounds for strife or conflict, and the resulting waste and corruption (fasad) they create. Peace, not war or violence, is God's true purpose for humanity (2:208).
Third, given man's capacity for wrongdoing, there will always be some who choose to violate their nature and transgress against God's commandments. Adam becomes fully human only when he chooses to heed Iblis's (Satan's) temptation and disobeys God. As a result of this initial act of disobedience, human beings are expelled from the Garden to dwell on earth as "enemies to each other" {2:36, 7:24). Thus, wars and the evils that stem from them, the Qur'an suggests, are the inevitable consequences of the uniquely human capacity for moral choice.
Function of War

In the modern international system, the functions of war, as a social practice, may
be considered from three perspectives:
1.that of an individual state,
2.that of the system of states,
3.and that of the society of states.

From the point of view of an individual state, war has been an instrument of policy, one of the means by which states objectives may be attained.

From the point of view of the system of states, war has been the principle mechanism, in what Waltz called, the distribution of capabilities, an element rejecting the distribution of power across states in the system, and, at one and the same time, an ultimate arbiter of the shape of the system and the position of states within it.
It is war, in this respect, that helps to determine whether particular states survive or are eliminated, whether they rise or decline.

From the point of view of the society of states, war has a dual aspect.
On the one hand, war is a manifestation of disorder, a threat of breakdown of the society of states itself and of a return to a pre-society state of affairs where war of all against all prevails.
Specially, it a means that the society of states limits war to keep it within the common rules laid down by the society of states itself.
On the other hand, war, as an instrument of states policies and a basis determinant of the shape of the system, is a means that the society of states employs to achieve its own purposes.
Specially, it means that the society of states embarks on war to promote the common values and interests laid down by the society of states itself. In other words, war holds an ambiguous role from this perspective of being simultaneously the decisive threat to the society of states, and the instrument of protecting it.

Wars often start over territory. A civilizations lands might be too small to support the current population well, and a war is an excellent solution in two ways.
If the war is won, more territory is acquired by the victorious nation. This decreases the number of people crammed into one area, which alleviates population density.

Limits on War

It was the 1648 Peace of Westphalia that coded the principle of sovereignty, and its corollary rule of non-intervention, and that conned the right to wage war to sovereign states as the prerogative of their sovereignty.
The society of states also restricted the way in which war is waged, jus in bello, as articulated in the final acts of 1899 and 1997 Hague conferences, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, and two 1977Additional Protocols for instance.
In addition to restriction imposed on the conduct of war, the society of states also limited the geographical spread of war by enunciating laws of neutrality, laying down rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents in relation to each other.

It was the 1945 Charter of the United Nations that conned the right to war to self-defense against the violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.
On the other hand, the society of states has also sought to use war as a means to protect and enforce common rules, to protect common values and to maintain international order: a critical aspect of war, bearing in mind that international order lacks mechanisms of just change. Specially, the goals of the United Nations, as laid down

The Geneva Conventions

In 1864, several states created an international agreement that regulated acceptable behavior during war and armed conflicts. Since then, the Geneva Conventions have been amended in 1906, 1929, and 1949 as the nature of war and warfare has changed. The agreements prohibit torture, rape, genocide, mutilation, slavery, and other crimes against humanity. The conventions also state that prisoners of war must be treated humanely and that civilians may not be used as hostages.
                                             
Important Theories

War seems to be part of the human condition. We have records of war going back beyond written records, and there is even evidence that some animals like chimps and ants go to war as well. But why do we do it? Here are ten of the most important theories.

The Male Warrior Hypothesis
Formulated by a group of evolutionary psychologists, this hypothesis suggests that men evolved to be violent and warlike in order to secure access to women and other resources. Essentially, forming violent coalitions with fellow men was a mating strategy. The more successful the "war coalition" was, the more successful the men would be in passing along their genes. Often this idea is reduced to the notion that men's sex drives are at the root of war, which is only half the story. In fact, the idea is that men evolved to form war bands with each other to gain access to resources. Having such resources would have made them better able to support families and communities, and thus pass along a genetic predisposition for forming armies.
Another version of this idea is the "demonic male hypothesis," which suggests that the urge to go to war goes back to the last common ancestor between humans and apes. Because chimps exhibit behavior that is warlike — with one band of males attacking another band — evolutionary biologists have suggested that human males inherited the urge to make war from distant evolutionary ancestors that we share with other hominids.
War as Predation
Essayist Barbara Ehrenreich spent many years researching the origins of war, and determined that the male warrior hypothesis didn't exactly fit the facts. Instead, she suggests that war grows out of the ancient human fear of predatory animals. When humans were evolving, one of our formative experiences as a species would have been hiding from more skillful predators than Homo sapiens. But once we'd gained the tools necessary to be predators ourselves, we celebrated this accomplishment in "blood rites" of sacrifice. These rites began as hunting rituals, but over time evolved into war rituals with neighboring humans. This theory explains why war doesn't usually feel "natural" to most men, and requires a kind of ritualistic transformation like a religious warrior ritual or Basic Training. War is a learned behavior, and its rituals are a defense against fear of predation.
The Persuasive Hawk
In debates over conflicts, there are hawks and doves, with hawks favoring forceful actions to end tensions and doves advocating negotiation. Hawks usually win because of inherent biases we all have. Nobel laureate in economics Daniel Kahneman and government researcher Jonathan Renshon crystallized this idea in a famous article for Foreign Policy, where they explained that, oddly, the Persuasive Hawk Theory is a result of humanity's optimism bias:
Psychological research has shown that a large majority of people believe themselves to be smarter, more attractive, and more talented than average, and they commonly overestimate their future success. People are also prone to an "illusion of control": They consistently exaggerate the amount of control they have over outcomes that are important to them — even when the outcomes are in fact random or determined by other forces.
In other words, we go to war because we mistakenly believe that we are always going to win, because we are the best. A related idea is the "Rubicon Theory," which suggests that when people believe they are already threat they cross a psychological threshold where new biases take over. Instead of proceeding rationally, they become overconfident and engage in riskier behavior — such as starting a war instead of seeking peaceful alternatives.
Malthusian Overpopulation
Based on Thomas Malthus' population theories, this idea suggests simply that war is the inevitable result of an expanding population with scarce resources. Stanford economist Ran Ambramitzky explains this idea quite simply in a paper. The human population increases at a geometric rate, faster than the food supply. Voluntary "preventative checks" try to keep population growth down, such as when people make rational decisions about the number of kids they are going to have based on their income, etc. When these checks fail, "positive checks," including war, famine and diseases, reduce the population and balance it with resources. Malthus believed that as long as humanity didn't come up with decent preventative checks, the positive check of war would ensure that population didn't outstrip food supply.
This idea overlaps a bit with the "ecological imbalance" theory of war, in which "conflict flash points" are the result of ecological stress from humans exploiting too many resources from the land. When resources run out, conflicts arise.
Youth Bulge
A popular theory right now, this idea suggests that violence and wars are the result of a large population of men with a lack of peaceful employment opportunities. The excess youth will be drawn to fighting and be killed, reducing the population.
Groupthink
Groupthink theory explains that during a crisis, groups — no matter how smart or well-informed — will suppress dissenting opinions because of the pressure to agree on a plan of action, leading them to make terrible decisions. This is in some sense a more policy-oriented version of the male warrior theory crossed with the persuasive hawk. The idea is that, when threatened, people naturally form bands of "us" vs. "them," and then make risky decisions in order to maintain their sense of superior group identity. Political scientists have recently applied the theory to the Iraq war.
Bargaining Model
Perhaps, say some social scientists, war isn't a deep-seated urge that or emotional reaction that comes from our evolution. Maybe it's just a form of political maneuvering that we've developed along with civilization. Seen in this light, war is just an extreme version of bargaining, where two groups try to resolve disputes over everything from allocation of resources to social justice. Writes scholar Dan Reiter:
Critically, the bargaining model does not see war as the breakdown of diplomacy but rather as a continuation of bargaining, as negotiations occur during war, and war ends when a deal is struck.
This model is helpful for international relations, because it suggests that every war is a negotiation and resolution waiting to happen.
Terror Management
The theory suggests that humans form cultural groups such as tribes and nations because they need to believe in something that will live on after they die. We all fear our own mortality, but our cultures give us beliefs and rituals that buffer us from that fear. Problems arise when these beliefs are threatened. Terror management theory suggests that for many people, an attack on their nation or group arouses their basic fear of death. You can see traces of the Rubicon theory here, where threats to the group cause people to cross a threshold where they are willing to make violent decisions that they would never make in everyday life. Terror management theory holds that crossing this threshold makes people willing to die to preserve their culture — because, after all, it is only their culture that can live on after them.
The Aggressive Drive
Aggression is a fighting instinct that helps individuals and species survive. In animals, there are innate inhibitions against killing others of the same species, such as the display of submissive gestures. But it's different for humans: weapons and communal aggression ("militant enthusiasm") escalate our ability to defend ourselves, but also to inflict violence on other groups. The inevitable expression of human aggression is war. This idea suggests that war is specific to humanity, as a result of our advanced tools and social organization.
War Is Learned (And Can Be Unlearned)
First proposed by anthropologist Margaret Mead in the early twentieth century, this hypothesis suggests that war is not the inevitable consequence of our competitive, aggressive nature. Rather, it is a social invention that can be unlearned. This actually dovetails with the "aggressive drive" theory, which suggests that humans may be aggressive like other animals — but our social organization is what leads to war. It is also a sharp rebuke to the evolutionary psychology idea of warrior men, and to the neo-Malthusian notion that war is inevitable when our population grows. Given that war is a social response to our environment and to each other, it makes sense that the solution to war would be social as well. We can learn peace instead of learning war — and we don't have to change our genomes to do it.

Causes of War

Political scientists have long debated the causes of war. These scholars have come up with the following list:
Human nature: Humans are naturally violent and aggressive, making war inevitable.
Regime types: Some regimes are more prone to waging war than others.
Example: There has been extensive research on whether democracies are less likely to start wars than other regimes. Overall, it appears that democracies are less likely to fight other democracies, a phenomenon scholars refer to as the democratic peace. Democracies are, however, just as likely as other types of regimes to fight nondemocracies.
Ideology: Some political beliefs favor war more than others. Some scholars blame fascism, for example, for World War II.
Religion: Religious belief has driven many states to war, either to spread the faith or to eradicate heretics.
Example: During the early modern era, nearly every European country experienced numerous wars of religion as the Catholics sought to destroy the Protestants. The wars of religion culminated in the Thirty Years’ War, which stretched from Spain and France to the eastern stretches of Germany during the seventeenth century. It was a brutal and horrific war, and the Catholics’ failure to win the war marked the end of the major religious wars in Europe.
The global system: Because the global system is anarchic, states must engage in war to protect themselves.
Economics and resources: Disputes over resources often lead to war.

Types of War

Although all wars are violent, not all wars are the same. In fact, there are many different types of wars, which can be classified according to which people actually fight, the intensity of the conflict, and the extent of combatants’ use of violence, among other factors.
Scholars generally describe five types of war:

Total war
Limited war
Guerrilla war
Civil war
Proxy war

Total War

A total war is a war in which combatants use every resource available to destroy the social fabric of the enemy. Total wars are highly destructive and are characterized by mass civilian casualties because winning a total war often requires combatants to break the people’s will to continue fighting. World Wars I and II were total wars, marked by the complete destruction of the civilian economy and society in many countries, including France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, Great Britain, and Japan.

Limited War

A limited war is a war fought primarily between professional armies to achieve specific political objectives without causing widespread destruction. Although the total of civilian casualties may be high, combatants do not seek to completely destroy the enemy’s social and economic frameworks. The Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 was a limited war in which the United States and its allies forcibly removed Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Guerrilla War

A guerrilla war is a war in which one or both combatants use small, lightly armed militia units rather than professional, organized armies. Guerrilla fighters usually seek to topple their government, often enjoying the support of the people. These wars are often very long but also tend to be successful for the insurgents as evidenced by Mao Zedong’s victory over Chiang Kai-shek in China in the 1940s, the Vietcong’s victory over the United States in the Vietnam War, and the Mujahideen’s victory over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Civil War

A civil war is a war fought within a single country between or among different groups of citizens who want to control the government and do not recognize another group’s right to rule. Civil wars are almost always total wars because each side feels compelled to destroy the enemy’s political support base. Regional rifts, such as the American Civil War between the North and the South, characterize some civil wars, whereas other civil wars have been fought among ethnic rivals, religious rivals, and rival clans. Revolutions can spark civil wars as well.

Proxy War

A proxy war is a war fought by third parties rather than by the enemy states themselves. Many of the militarized conflicts during the Cold War, such as the Korean War and the Vietnam
War, can be interpreted as proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, neither of which wanted to fight each other directly.

Categorizing Wars

A war can often be a limited war, a guerrilla war, and a civil war all at the same time. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 is a great example. The United States sent trainers, money, and weapons to Afghan rebels to fight against the invaders, making it a low-intensity, limited conflict from the U.S. point of view. The Afghan resistance mostly relied on guerrilla tactics. And the war split Afghanistan, so it was also a civil war.

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