Share this Blog

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

hegemony

The dominance or leadership of one social group or nation over others the hegemony of a single member state is not incompatible with a genuine confederation to say they have priority is not to say they have complete hegemony the consolidation of the United States' hegemony over a new international economic system

(Greek: γεμονία hēgemonía, English: [UK] /hɨˈɡɛməni/, [US]: pronounced /hɨˈdʒɛməni/; "leadership" or "hegemon" for "leader") is a form of political dominance wherein one great power can exercise its influence to pressure other states into changing their external and internal policies by utilizing a combination of military force, technical strength, economic coercion, and active cooperation. Hegemony is internally reinforced by a set of common values and institutions, and the external manifestation of hegemonic power can take many forms: from the acquisition of material resources to social domination, from consensus to coercion (Agnew 2005:20-21; Destradi 2010:912-913; Watson 2007:80-81). While initially referring to the political dominance of certain ancient Greek city-states over their neighbors, the term has come to be used in a variety of other contexts, in particular Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony.

History of hegemony

As the modern world-system emerged in the sixteenth century, so did the modern model of hegemony. This period was one of unprecedented expansion of European scope and power, as the New World was first incorporated and long-distance maritime trade routes with the Americas and East Asia became increasingly vital to the propagation of power (Black 2008:27-29). During this struggle for control of the now greatly expanded world market, Portugal and Spain emerged as early leaders, especially after the union of the Habsburgs. Jeremy Black and Herman Schwartz suggest that while Portugal, Spain, Britain, France, and Holland all had claims to maritime dominance, the Portuguese came forward as a proto-hegemony after their economic expansion into the Indian Ocean (Black 2008:29-30; Schwartz 2010:65). The Dutch quickly replaced the Portuguese as Habsburg Portugal succumbed to external pressures after years of war with Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire (Schwartz 2010:65-73).

Thus, around 1580, the Dutch began the first full-fledged, widely recognized hegemony of the modern world-system. The Dutch thrived as imperialistic mercantilism flourished among the great European powers, and dominated the world economy through overt control of trade routes throughout the Baltic and the East Indies (Black 2008:49-63). Schwartz suggests that as a hegemon, the Netherlands did not rely solely on military might, but rather controlled the world-system intellectually and economically; while the Dutch did control as many as half of Eurasia's warships, their dominance depended on heavy importation of raw materials and sheer purchasing power (Schwartz 2010:73-75). Sandra Destradi states that this reliance on the marketplace society over martial prowess is an important component of the hegemon--while it possesses the capacity to dominate through sheer force, it also has the ability (and perhaps the responsibility) to abstain from using this power (Destradi 2010:913).

After the erosion of the Dutch hegemony due to a period of warring from 1688-1792, Britain emerged as a new hegemon. Britain, much like the Netherlands, depended on overwhelming naval power and possessed the military security to control the maritime economy (Schwartz 2010:74). However, where the Dutch relied upon consensual dominance, Britain originally took a more militaristic approach. In this way, the British hegemony manifested itself geographically as an empire (Agnew 2005:20). Distinction between hegemony and empire can be difficult, but Agnew suggests that the main differences lie in the hegemon's wont to persuade or reward subordinates instead of promptly coercing them, along with its lack of dependency on purely territorial power (Agnew 2005:22-23). Britain held an intermediate position, remaining both empire and hegemon. But as the British industrial revolution moved forward, Britain settled into a much more Gramscian position of hegemonic power, relying on the culture of technology to unite the new British society (Schwartz 2010:84). Production boomed as iron and cotton textile manufactures were industrialized, and Britain began to flood the global market with exports. British efficiency proved itself to be the hegemon's most valuable commodity, and by 1860 Britain's modest population--2 percent of the world population--was producing 20 percent of the world's manufacturing output (Schwartz 2010:84-85). Industrialization normalized the often-disparate British populations, becoming a vital part in the institutionalization of British culture throughout the empire's vast expanses of territory.

Even with these massive advantages in the economic sector, the British hegemony was not without resistance. Most notable is that of France during the Napoleonic Wars, as Napoleon pursued his own colonial goals within Europe while Britain's focus remained outside of Europe. Napoleon's campaigns throughout mainland Europe, while never reaching British soil, directly challenged Britain's dominance in the European sphere. According to Black, Napoleon's ultimate failure to thwart the ascent of British hegemony was due to a lack of vision, as he never fully understood the dynamics of large-scale commercial trade and never possessed a comprehensive strategic goal (Black 2008:90-91). The British knowledge of market society proved to be its greatest weapon, as Britain held a huge resource advantage and was able to win the struggle for alliances (Black 2008:91-93).

The exact timeframe of Britain's loss of hegemonic status is controversial, but most scholars place it somewhere between 1890 and 1945. Peter Hugill claims that the United States began its push for hegemony as early as 1860, but that this American hegemony was never fully realized until post-World War II (Hugill 2010:403-404). The rise of industry in Germany and the United States proved the main contributing factor in the slow decline of the British hegemony, especially with the advent of heavy rail accelerating the resource allocation in North America and Central/Eastern Europe (Black 2008:137-138). International transportation and international communication had become the means of power in the now-global world-system, and naval dominance could no longer compete (Hugill 2010:404-405). This slow decline then met with catastrophe, in the form of World War I and the Great Depression. Monetary crises, a failure to grasp continuous-flow production, and the inability to maintain control over trade networks led to the eventual collapse of the British hegemony in the 1920s and 1930s (Schwartz 2010:165-177).

Where Britain failed to embrace a changing world market, the United States excelled. By building its economy on the automobile, petroleum, the assembly line, and standardized commodities, America was able to continuously expand its productivity throughout the early 20th century (Schwartz 2010:177). By the close of World War II, America had cemented itself as a hegemonic power, having dominated the technological development in the fields of international transportation and communication. Throughout the Cold War era, a starkly Gramscian mass culture emerged in the United States as multinational companies began to thrive. American hegemonic expansion has long been "characterized not by the acquisition of new territories, but by their penetration," and these multinational companies are perfect examples, even when their interests do not line up with the interests of the state (Hugill 2010:421). While some scholars maintain that America's advance was due to the inherent coercion and imposition of World War II, the rise to hegemony was much more likely a function of America's technological superiority and authority over transportation, communication, and oil.

Theory of hegemony

The theory of hegemony harkens to the work of Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, who theorized that cultural and social relations, along with economic supremacy, are key to the success of a hegemon (Destradi 2010:913; Agnew 2005:20). Agnew refers to this process as "consensual dominance:" the conquest of a culture through the establishment of a universal ideology determined by the experiences of a dominant state or social group (Agnew 2005:20-22). This Gramscian view of hegemonic power involves the subversion of the citizenry to the point where "subordinates believe that the power rests upon the consensus of the majority," even when this may not be the case (Destradi 2010:913-914). The homogenization of the populace ensures social domination and state consolidation, allowing force and coercion (while always present) to largely go unused (Agnew 2005:20-21, 25; Watson 2007:80-81). In this way, hegemony is enough to "ensure conformity of behavior in most people most of the time" (Destradi 2010:913).

The ability to craft alliances, along with similar cooperative strategies, are extremely important tools possessed by the hegemon. Through consensual domination, hegemonies not only internally control their populations, but also influence the external policies of subordinate states (Black 2008:91). Robert Keohane argues that hegemonies are able to influence the political landscape by supervising the relationships between subordinate states, effectively controlling hierarchical power and directing economic markets (Keohane 2005:44-45). Keohane admits that this influence and the cooperation of the hegemon and its secondary states is an inherently fragile bond, as it will inevitably lead to a core-periphery confrontation. Uneven development ensures that cooperation is incomplete and tenuous, although not necessarily without benefits for each state involved (Keohane 2005:44). Adam Watson labels this structure of dubious cooperation as the "dynamic equilibrium" of hegemony--a system subject to continuous change, where the constancy of the hegemon's principles and practices works to fortify alliances and provide coherence within the hegemon's community of allies .

One persistent question throughout this latest hegemonic cycle has been whether hegemony is necessary for the success of the world-system. This concept of hegemonic stability implies that the hegemon possesses such vast material and productive capabilities that it can singularly affect the world economy (Destradi 2010:914). Keohane states that this would require control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets, and production of highly valued goods--in essence, nearly owning the free world market (Keohane 2005:32-35). The evidence for the validity of hegemonic stability is sparse, and thus the theory is "suggestive but by no means definitive"--concentrated power alone cannot stabilize the international economic marketplace (Keohane 2005:38). The global market relies on cooperation above all else, and it is impossible to prove that a hegemon is necessary for cooperation between modern states. In fact, Destradi states that the model of "benevolent hegemony" is intrinsically flawed because of the hegemon's primary goal of following its own interests and, in doing so, establishing a stable environment only for itself.

Debate over the emergence of the next hegemon

While debates over hegemonic stability rage on, the most contentious issue surrounding hegemony continues to be the question of who will be the next hegemon. Some scholars argue that the United States is in a long period of decline, and must soon relinquish its seat of power, while others argue that the American hegemony has no end in sight (Black 2008:232-233; Lee 2009:40-41). Some point to Japan, the European Union, China, or India, while others believe that the contemporary manifestation of the world-system no longer supports the concept of hegemony at all (Clark 2009: 35-36). Perhaps the rhythm will continue, or perhaps it will fade away. In either case, the unprecedentedly rapid globalization in the past twenty years has drastically changed how the world-system functions, and the cycle of hegemony must adapt quickly or be swallowed into a newly structured world. The hegemon of the past--that which affects policies through force, technology, economics, or diplomacy--may need to evolve once more to remain viable in the future.

Resistance and survival

In Mirror for Humanity: A Concise Introduction to Cultural Anthropology (2004), Conrad Phillip Kottak elucidates hegemony ideologically — that an ideology explains why the extant order (politico-military and socio-economic) is in the best interest of everyone; the ideology promises much, and asks the ideologue's (believer's) patience (time) for the promises to be fulfilled

Hegemony takes place in variety of ways…

Cultural hegemony is the philosophic and sociological concept, originated by the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, that a culturally-diverse society can be ruled or dominated by one of itssocial classes. It is the dominance of one social group over another, e.g. the ruling class over all other classes. The theory claims that the ideas of the ruling class come to be seen as the norm; they are seen as universal ideologies, perceived to benefit everyone whilst only really benefiting the ruling class.

Cultural Hegemony: Gramsci’s theory

For Karl Marx, a capitalist society’s economic recessions and practical contradictions would provoke the working class to revolution in deposing capitalism — and then to restructuring the existing institutions (economic, political, social) per rational, socialist models; thus, beginning the transition to acommunist society. In Marxist terms, the society’s dialectically-changing economy determines its cultural and political superstructures, i.e. its social and economic classes. Despite Marx and Friedrich Engels having predicted this eschatological scenario in 1848, decades later, the workers — the economic core of an industrialised society — had yet to effect it.

To understand this, Gramsci posits a strategic distinction, between a War of Position and a War of Manoeuvre. The war of position is intellectual, a culture war in which the anti-capitalist educators, agitators and organizers seek to have the dominant voice in the mass media, other mass organisations, and the schools (and actively conduct ideological subversion). Once achieved, this position will be used to increase class consciousness, teach revolutionary theory and analysis, and to inspire revolutionary organisation. On winning the intellectual war of position, communist leaders would then have the necessary political power and popular support to begin the war of manoeuvre — the armed insurrection against capitalism.

The phrase "the long march through the institutions" is used in Marxist speech to refer to a war of position, alluding to the Long March of the Chinese Red Army in the 1930s. The phrase does not originate with Gramsci, though it is widely attributed to him. Rather, it was coined by German student movement leader Rudi Dutschke in 1967 as „Der lange Marsch durch die Institutionen“, as his reformulation of Gramsci's ideas, using language influenced by then-current interest in Maoism.

Although cultural domination was first analysed in economic class terms, it is broadly applicable tosocial class. Gramsci suggested that prevailing cultural norms must not be perceived as either “natural” and “inevitable”, but, that said cultural norms (institutions, practices, beliefs) must be investigated for their roots in societal domination and their implications for societal liberation.

Cultural hegemony is neither monolithic nor unified, rather it is a complex of layered social structures (classes). Each has a “mission” (purpose) and an internal logic, allowing its members to behave in a particular way that is different from that of the members of the other social classes, while also coexisting with these other classes. Because of their different social missions, the classes will be able to coalesce into a greater whole, a society, with a greater social mission. This greater, societal mission is different from the specific missions of the individual classes, because it assumes and includes them to itself, the whole.

Likewise, does cultural hegemony work; although each person in a society meaningfully lives life in his or her social class, society’s discrete classes might appear to have little in common with the life of an individual person. However, perceived as a whole, each person’s life contributes to the greater society’s hegemony. Diversity, variation, and freedom will apparently exist, since most people “see” many different life circumstances; but they are incapable of perceiving the greater hegemonic pattern created when the lives they themselves witness coalesce into a “society”. Through the existence of minor, different circumstances, a greater, layered hegemony is maintained, not fully recognized by most of the people living in it.

In a layered cultural hegemony, personal "common sense" maintains a dual structural role. Individuals utilize this "common sense" to cope with daily life and explain to themselves the small segment of the social order they come to witness in the course of this life. However, because it is by nature limited in focus, common sense also inhibits the ability to perceive the greater, systemic nature of socio-economic exploitation that cultural hegemony makes possible. People concentrate their attention upon their immediate concerns and problems in their personal lives, rather than upon the fundamental sources of their social and economic oppression.

Although the concept of cultural hegemony has primarily been used by leftists, organized conservative social organizations (movements) also have used it in their politics. An example, in the US of the 1990s, were the efforts of evangelical Christian organizations to win election onto local school boards in order to have the power to dictate curricula aligned with their religious interpretation of what constitutes a proper publiceducation. To wit, in 1992, at the Republican Convention, the rightist politician Patrick Buchanan addressed the conventioneers using the term Culture War in describing his perception of [[US politics], as being the socio-political struggle between US conservatism and US liberalism.

Alain De Benoist and others from the European New Right movement have also been known to follow and appreciate Gramscian notions and ideas.

As a theory, cultural hegemony has deeply influenced Eurocommunism, the social sciences, and activist politics. In the social sciences, its theoretic application in examining major discourses (e.g. those posited by Michel Foucault) is an important aspect of anthropology, political science, sociology, and cultural studies; moreover, in education the concepts of cultural hegemony led to the development of critical pedagogy and the technique of communist ideological subversion of Western democracies.

Prepared by Biju P R,Assistant Professor in Poltical Sceince,Govt Brennen College,Thalassery

Marx's theory of the state


Marx's ideas about the state can be divided into three subject areas: pre-capitalist states, states in the capitalist (i.e. present) era, and the state (or absence of one) in post-capitalist society. Overlaying this is the fact that his own ideas about the state changed as he grew older, differing in his early pre-communist phase, the "young Marx" phase which predates the unsuccessful 1848 uprisings in Europe, and in his mature, more nuanced work.

The bourgeois state

In Marx's 1843 Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, his basic conception is that the state and civil society are separate; however, he already saw some limitations to that model:

"The political state everywhere needs the guarantee of spheres lying outside it."

He as yet was saying nothing about the abolition of private property, does not express a developed theory of class, and "the solution [he offers] to the problem of the state/civil society separation is a purely political solution, namely universal suffrage." (Evans, 112)

By the time of The German Ideology (1846) he is seeing the state as a creature of the bourgeois economic interest. Two years later that idea was put explosively in The Communist Manifesto

The executive of the modern state is nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

This represents the high point of conformance of the state theory to a strict economic interpretation of history: The forces of production determine peoples' production relations; their production relations determine all other relations, including the political ("Determines" is the strong form of the claim, Marx also uses "conditions". Also, even "determination" is not causality, and some reciprocity of action is admitted.) The bourgeoisie control the economy, therefore they control the state. The state, in this theory, is an instrument of class rule.

The Communist Manifesto was a short polemical work; more detail on the theories concerned can be obtained by going back to The German Ideology:

The Relation of State and Law to Property. . . In the case of the nations which grew out of the Middle Ages, tribal property evolved through various stages - feudal landed property, corporative moveable property, capital invested in manufacture - to modern capital, determined by big industry and universal competition, i.e. pure private property, which has cast off all semblance of a communal institution and has shut out the State from any influence on the development of property. To this modern private property corresponds the modern State, which, purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it, as reflected in the rise and fall of State funds on the stock exchange. By the mere fact that it is a class and no longer an estate, the bourgeoisie is forced to organise itself no longer locally, but nationally, and to give a general form to its mean average interest. Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests. The independence of the State is only found nowadays in those countries where the estates have not yet completely developed into classes, where the estates, done away with in more advanced countries, still have a part to play, and where there exists a mixture; countries, that is to say, in which no one section of the population can achieve dominance over the others. This is the case particularly in Germany. The most perfect example of the modern State is North America. The modern French, English and American writers all express the opinion that the State exists only for the sake of private property, so that this fact has penetrated into the consciousness of the normal man.

Economic Dependence of the State on the Bourgeoisie.With the development and accumulation of bourgeois property, i.e., with the development of commerce and industry, individuals grew richer and richer while the state fell ever more deeply into debt. This phenomenon was evident already in the first Italian commercial republics; later, since the last century, it showed itself to a marked degree in Holland, where the stock exchange speculator Pinto drew attention to it as early as 1750, and now it is again occurring in England. It is therefore obvious that as soon as the bourgeoisie has accumulated money, the state has to beg from the bourgeoisie and in the end it is actually bought up by the latter. This takes place in a period in which the bourgeoisie is still confronted by another class, and consequently the state can retain some appearance of independence in relation to both of them. Even after the state has been bought up, it still needs money and, therefore, continues to be dependent on the bourgeoisie; nevertheless, when the interests of the bourgeoisie demand it, the state can have at its disposal more funds than states which are less developed and, therefore, less burdened with debts. However, even the least developed states of Europe, those of the Holy Alliance, are inexorably approaching this fate, for they will be bought up by the bourgeoisie; then Stirner will be able to console them with the identity of private and state property, especially his own sovereign, who is trying in vain to postpone the hour when political power will be sold to the “burghers” who have become “angry”.

By the early 1850s, political events in Europe, which he covered in articles for the New York Daily Tribune as well as a number of more substantial pieces, were forcing Marx to modify his theory to allow considerably more autonomy for the state. By 1851, the mid century rebellions had all given way to conservativism; the principal countries of Europe had autocratic or aristocratic governments: Napoleon III in France, Frederick Wilhelm IV in Germany, and in England a parliament populated mainly by members of the aristocratic class, whether Whig or Conservative. Yet at the same time the bourgeoisie had economic power in those places. For an economic determinist, this was clearly an anomalous situation, and Marx gave it considerable attention. His solution is what Elster has described as the "abdication" or "abstention" theory. It contends that the bourgeoisie found that the advantages of wielding direct power were, under the circumstances, outweighed by various costs and disadvantages, so they were willing to tolerate an aristocratic or despotic government as long as it did not act too detrimentally to their interests. Marx makes several points. Regarding England, he says of the bourgeoisie: "if the aristocracy is their vanishing opponent the working class is their arising enemy. They prefer to compromise with the vanishing opponent rather than to strengthen the rising enemy, to whom the future belongs." He also suggests that it would be better for the bourgeoisie not to wield power directly because this would make their dominince too obvious, creating a clear target for proletarian attack. Better to make the workers fight a "two front war" (Elster) against the aristocracy in government and the bourgeoisie in the economy. This would, among other things, make it difficult for the proletarians to form a clear conception of who was their principal enemy. Regarding France, he suggests that the bourgeoisie recognised that they had been better off under the monarchy (1830-1848) than during the brief period when they wielded power themselves (1848-1851) "since they must now confront the subjugated classes and contend against them without mediation, without the concealment afforded by the crown."

Prepared by Biju P R,Assistant Professor in Poltical Sceince,Govt Brennen College,Thalassery

COMMUNITARIANISM

COMMUNITARIANISM

Communitarianism, as a group of related but distinct philosophies, began in the late 20th century, opposing exalted forms of individualism. Not necessarily hostile to social liberalism or even social democracy, communitarianism emphasizes the need to balance individual rights and interests with that of the community as a whole, and that individual people (or citizens) are shaped by the cultures and values of their communities.

TERMINOLOGY

Though the term communitarianism is of 20th-century origin, it is derived from the 1840s term communitarian, which was coined by Goodwyn Barmby to refer to one who was a member or advocate of a communalist society. The modern use of the term is a redefinition of the original sense. Many communitarians trace their philosophy to earlier thinkers. The term is primarily used in two senses:

· Philosophical communitarianism considers classical liberalism to beontologically and epistemologically incoherent, and opposes it on those grounds. Unlike classical liberalism, which construes communities as originating from the voluntary acts of pre-community individuals, it emphasizes the role of the community in defining and shaping individuals. Communitarians believe that the value of community is not sufficiently recognized in liberal theories of justice.

· Ideological communitarianism is characterized as a radical centrist ideologythat is sometimes marked by leftism on economic issues and moralism or conservatism on social issues. This usage was coined recently. When the term is capitalized, it usually refers to the Responsive Communitarian movement ofAmitai Etzioni and other philosophers.

ORIGINS

Communitarianism has been traced back to early monasticism. but in the twentieth century began to be formulated as a philosophy by Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker movement. In an early article the Catholic Worker clarified the dogma of the Mystical Body of Christ as the basis for the movement's communitarianism. Communitarianism is also related to the personalistphilosophy of Emmanuel Mounier.

Later secular communitarians began from analysis of classical republicanism, focusing on ancient Greek and Classicist writers. Since the beginnings of 1990's they incorporated post-modern concept of civil society into their philosophy. Soon due to work of Robert Putnam they mistakenly started to treatTocqueville as a main theoretician of civil society and their primary ancestor. Thus they engaged in direct clash with neo-liberal theory since Tocqueville was liberal not republican theorist, giving new impetus to their work.

PHILOSOPHICAL COMMUNITARIANISM

Communitarianism in philosophy, like other schools of thought in contemporary political philosophy, can be defined by its response to John Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Communitarians criticize the image Rawls presents of humans as atomistic individuals.

Communitarians claim values and beliefs are formed in public space, in which debate takes place. Both linguistic and non-linguistic traditions are communicated to children and form the backdrop against which individuals formulate and understand beliefs. The dependence of the individual upon community members is typically meant as descriptive. It does not mean that individuals should accept majority beliefs. Rather, if an individual rejects a majority belief, such as the historic belief that slavery is acceptable, he or she will do so for reasons that make sense within the community (for example, the Judeo-Christian conception of the imago Dei, or reasons deriving from secular Enlightenment humanism) rather than simply any reason at all. In this sense, the rejection of a single majority belief relies on other majority beliefs.

The following authors have communitarian tendencies in the philosophical sense, but have all taken pains to distance themselves from the political ideology known as communitarianism, which is discussed further below:

· Vincent Cespedes – Je t'aime. Une autre politique de l'amour (I Love You. A Different Politic of Love)

· Will Kymlicka

· Alasdair MacIntyre – After Virtue

· Michael Sandel – Liberalism and the Limits of Justice

· Charles Taylor – Sources of the Self

· Michael Walzer – Spheres of Justice

· Christos Yannaras – A Greek philosopher and theologian whose ideas tend to view communitarianism from a theological and ontological perspective.

IDEOLOGICAL COMMUNITARIANISM

Communitarian political philosophy

Social capital

Beginning in the late 20th century, many authors began to observe a deterioration in the social networks of the United States. In the book Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam observed that nearly every form of civic organization has undergone drops in membership exemplified by the fact that, while more people are bowling than in the 1950s, there are fewer bowling leagues. In recent years Putnam has revised this argument.[citation needed]

This results in a decline in "social capital", described by Putnam as "the collective value of all 'social networks' and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other". According to Putnam and his followers, social capital is a key component to building and maintaining democracy.

Communitarians seek to bolster social capital and the institutions of civil society. The Responsive Communitarian Platform described it thus:

"Many social goals . . . require partnership between public and private groups. Though government should not seek to replace local communities, it may need to empower them by strategies of support, including revenue-sharing and technical assistance. There is a great need for study and experimentation with creative use of the structures of civil society, and public-private cooperation, especially where the delivery of health, educational and social services are concerned."

Positive rights

Central to the communitarian philosophy is the concept of positive rights, which are rights or guarantees to certain things. These may include state subsidized education, state subsidized housing, a safe and clean environment, universal health care, and even the right to a job with the concomitant obligation of the government or individuals to provide one. To this end, communitarians generally support social security programs, public works programs, and laws limiting such things as pollution.

A common objection is that by providing such rights, communitarians violate the negative rights of the citizens; rights to not have something done for you. For example, taxation to pay for such programs as described above dispossesses individuals of property. Proponents of positive rights, by attributing the protection of negative rights to the society rather than the government, respond that individuals would not have any rights in the absence of societies—a central tenet of communitarianism—and thus have a personal responsibility to give something back to it. Some have viewed this as a negation of natural rights. However, what is or is not a "natural right" is a source of contention in modern politics, as well as historically; for example, whether or not universal health care, private property or protection from polluters can be considered a birthright.

Alternatively, some agree that negative rights may be violated by a government action, but argue that it is justifiable if the positive rights protected outweigh the negative rights lost. In the same vein, supporters of positive rights further argue that negative rights are irrelevant in their absence. Moreover, some communitarians "experience this less as a case of being used for others' ends and more as a way of contributing to the purposes of a community I regard as my own".

Comparison to other political philosophies

Communitarianism cannot be classified as being wholly left or right, and many theorists claim to represent a sort of radical center. Liberals in the American sense or social democrats in the European sense generally share the communitarian position on issues relating to the economy, such as the need for environmental protection and public education, but not on cultural issues. Communitarians and conservatives generally agree on cultural issues, such as support for character education and faith-based programs, but communitarians do not support the laissez-faire capitalism generally embraced by American conservatives.

Authoritarianism

Some people have argued that communitarianism's focus on social cohesion raises similarities with nationalistic communism, or various forms ofauthoritarianism, although supporters contend that there are substantial differences between communitarianism and authoritarianism, and that communitarianism has very little in common with Communism, which does not really value individual liberty at all.

Authoritarian governments often embrace extremist ideologies and rule with brute force, accompanied with severe restrictions on personal freedom, political and civil rights. Authoritarian governments are overt about the role of the government as director and commander. Civil society and democracy are not generally characteristic of authoritarian regimes. For the most part, communitarians emphasize the use of non-governmental organizations, such as private businesses, churches, non-profits, or labor unions, in furthering their goals.

COMMUNITARIAN MOVEMENT

The modern communitarian movement was first articulated by the Responsive Communitarian Platform, written in the United States by a group of ethicists, activists, and social scientists including Amitai Etzioni, Mary Ann Glendon, and William Galston.

The Communitarian Network, founded in 1993 by Amitai Etzioni, is the best-known group advocating communitarianism. One of the network's many initiatives to reach out to a broader public is the transnational project Diversity within Unity, which advocates a communitarian approach towards immigration and minority rights in today's diversifying societies. The project is endorsed by a diverse and international group of supporters, including current Dutch prime-minister Jan-Peter Balkenende from the Christian Democratic Appeal; Rita Süssmuth from the Christian Democratic Union; the Hungarian dissident and philosopher György Bence; British political scholar David Miller; and others.

A think tank called the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies is also directed by Etzioni. Other voices of communitarianism include Don Eberly, director of the Civil Society Project and Robert Putnam.

Influence in the United States

Reflecting the dominance of liberal and conservative politics in the United States, no major party and few elected officials advocate communitarianism. Thus there is no consensus on individual policies, but some that most communitarians endorse have been enacted.

President Bill Clinton was open about his support for much of Amitai Etzioni's philosophy, though whether this reflected on his actual policy program is debatable. It has also been suggested that the "compassionate conservatism" espoused by President Bush during his 2000 presidential campaign was a form of conservative communitarian thinking, though he too did not implement it in his policy program. Cited policies have included economic and rhetorical support for education, volunteerism, and community programs, as well as a social emphasis on promoting families, character education, traditional values, and faith-based projects.

Dana Milbank, writing in the Washington Post, remarked of modern communitarians, "There is still no such thing as a card-carrying communitarian, and therefore no consensus on policies. Some, such as John DiIulio and outside Bush adviser Marvin Olasky, favor religious solutions for communities, while others, like Etzioni and Galston, prefer secular approaches."

CRITICISM

Liberal theorists such as Simon Caney disagree that philosophical communitarianism has any interesting criticisms to make of liberalism. They reject the communitarian charges that liberalism neglects the value of community, and holds an "atomized" or asocial view of the self. If they are correct in this, then communitarian doctrine reduces to little more than traditionalism and cultural moral relativism.

According to scholar Peter Sutch, the principal criticisms of communitarianism are:

1. That communitarianism leads necessarily to moral relativism.

2. That this relativism leads necessarily to a re-endorsement of the status quo in international politics, and

3. That such a position relies upon a discredited ontological argument that posits the foundational status of the community or state.

However, he goes on to show that such arguments cannot be leveled against the particular communitarian theories of John Rawls, Michael Walzer and Mervyn Frost.[citation needed]

Critical communitarianism

Critical communitarianism combines epistemology, theories of sociopolitical power, theories of identities, and human rights studies. It offers to look into non-ruling communities in order to better comprehend state-society relationships. Theoretically, it shifts the attention from the state as the sole venue of political power and drills into theorizing state-society relations through looking into alternative and challenging locations of political power. Consequently, it invites new insights into the classical questions of what are the boundaries between state and society; what is a 'collective' good, and where and how human beings are shaping their consciousness, identities and practices. Normatively, it generates normative questions about relative morality and encourages us to empower cultural relativism and yet to acknowledge the existence of some cosmopolitan values. Empirically, it fosters empirical studies that examine internal conflicts, institutions, and power struggles within non-ruling communities in the context of local, regional, and global forces. Accordingly, it challenges the domination of liberalism and liberal jurisprudence as the hegemonic paradigm for explication, theorization, and substantiation of human virtues. Instead, it invites to include liberalism alongside elements of communitarianism as relative ways to both challenge symbolic power and to foster protection of non-ruling communities in order to achieve justice and peace.

Opposition

· Bruce Frohnen - author of The New Communitarians and the Crisis of Modern Liberalism (1996)

· Charles Arthur Willard - author of Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy, University of Chicago Press, 1996.

Prepared by Biju P R,Assistant Professor in Poltical Sceince,Govt Brennen College,Thalassery